Far from being “ho hum” as my colleague writes, the case of U. S. Bank, N.A. as servicer for the Tennessee Housing Development Agency v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, No. W2012-00053-COA-R3-CV, filed November 29, 2012, the did establish some important points of law – but from the insurer’s perspective, in limiting bad faith and TCPA recovery. The Court of Appeals was presented with appellate review of a trial court finding imposing bad faith and Consumer Protection Act damages upon Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company for failing to pay a mortgagee. The case actually arose from a Supreme Court ruling in U. S. Bank, N.A. v Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, 277 S.W. 3d 381 (Tenn. 2009), where the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the mere institution of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute and increase in hazard sufficient to allow an insurance company to avoid payment of a mortgagee under a standard mortgage clause. Upon remand, the trial court was presented with the issues of whether the interpretation advanced by Tennessee Farmers constituted bad faith and the violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court entered judgment under both bases, awarding the bank a judgment for the amount due on the mortgage plus accrued interest, but also attorney’s fees and costs based upon a finding that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy amounted to bad faith and an unfair act or practice under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Court of Appeals reversed.
From a defense perspective, the significance of this holding lies in the fact that the issue was one of first impression, and the Court of Appeals noted as follows:
We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy throughout the litigation amounted to bad faith and an unfair act or practice under the TCPA. As noted by the Supreme Court, the issue of whether, under a standard mortgage clause in a fire insurance policy, the Bank’s commencement of foreclosure proceedings amounted to an increase in hazard requiring notification to Tennessee Farmers involved ‘a matter of first impression.’…The Supreme Court further noted that ‘no Tennessee case has squarely addressed the precise issue presented….’ Moreover, prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion, this Court agreed with Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation of the policy. Clearly, reasonable minds disagreed over the precise issue which the trial court claimed to be well-settled. In fact, had the Supreme Court agreed with the position taken by this Court, there would be no basis for the trial court’s reasoning that Tennessee Farmers’ interpretation was unreasonable and inconsistent with well-settled law.
Three cheers for the Court of Appeals! On an issue of first impression, even where law exists on both sides of the issue from other jurisdictions, it seems to this writer that a judgment of bad faith or violation of the Consumer Protection Act should not be warranted. This case may be appealed even further, and we will see if the Supreme Court takes further action, but for now, it seems that justice has been done.
But, Brandon contends that the Court of Appeals implicitly recognized a common law bad faith cause of action. I disagree. Brandon noted that it seemed a “rather odd opinion for such a big issue.” Indeed, creating or recognizing a cause of action which has not been recognized in Tennessee law would seem to be more noteworthy. But here’s why I do not think the Court of Appeals implicitly sanctioned the cause of action. First, the Court of Appeals did not really address it. Second, what they did address were the facts which formed the basis of the trial court’s findings on BOTH a bad faith action and the TCPA.
The Court of Appeals simply confirmed that, under neither theory, the same set of facts did not create liability. The cause of action for common law bad faith failure to pay has never been entrenched in Tennessee law, as evidenced by the fact that the trial court did not cite to any Tennessee case law supporting such cause of action. It would have been nice had the Court of Appeals indicated such a cause of action did not exist, but to make the leap that, under these facts, the Court of Appeals impliedly authorized such action seems, to use Brandon’s phrase in good natured banter, “rather odd.”